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BAR BRIEFS 7
LIFE INSURANCE AS ASSETS AVAILABLE TO CREDITORS
OF THE INSURED DURING HIS LIFETIME UNDER
THE LAW OF NORTH DAKOTA
Ross C. TISDALE
Professor of Law, University of North Dakota
Two sections of the 1943 Revised Code of North Dakota must
be examined as a prelude to any discussion of the topic at hand.
Section 26-1017 provides:'
"The surrender value of any policy of life insurance which, upon
the death of the insured, would be payable to the wife or children or
any relative of the insured, dependent, or likely to be dependent, upon
him for support, shall be exempt absolutely from the claims of
creditors of the insured. No creditor of the insured, and no court or
officer of a court acting for any such creditors, shall have the right
under any circumstances to elect for the insured to have such policy of
insurance surrendered or in any wise converted into money, and no
such policy of life insurance or property right therein belonging to the
holder, and no value thereof, shall be subject to seizure under any
process of any court under any circumstances.'a
Section 26-1018 provides:2
"The avails of a life insurance policy or of a contract payable by
any mutual aid or benevolent society, when made payable to the deceased,
to the personal representative of the deceased, to his heirs, or to his
estate, shall not be subject to the debts of the decedent upon the
death of such insured or member of such society except by special
contract..."a
At the outset, it should be noted that the discussion involves the
second section by indirection only. We are primarily concerned with
the first section, which purports to exempt the proceeds of the policy
from the creditors of the insured during his lifetime.' It must appear
IN. D. Laws 1915 c. 173, s. 1; N. D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925), s. 878a; N. D. REV.
CODE (1943), s. 26-1017.
'(a) The original bill was introduced in the Senate. Englund, S. B. 103. The following
amendment was proposed by the judiciary committee: "If the premium is paid by any person
with intent to defraud his creditors, an amount equal to the premiums so paid. with interest
thereon, shall inure to their benefit... The amendment failed to carry the House. For form
of amendment, see SEN. JOUR. (1915) p. 226.
' N. D. REV. CODE (1895), S. 6385; amended N. I). Laws 1897. c. 111, s. 24 ; N.D. REV. CODE
(1899), s. 6385; N. D. REV. CODE (1905), S. 8083; N. D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. (1913), S.
8719; amnended N. D. Laws 1927, c. 225, s. 1 ; and again in N. D. Laws 1929, c. 149, s. 1 ; N. D.
REV. CODE (1943), S. 26-1018.
'(a) A brief discussion of this section will be found in 18 BAR BRIEFS, STATE BAR Ass'N
OF N. DAK., p. 102 (Jan. 1942). As originally enacted this statute read: "The avails of a
life insurance policy or of a contract payable by any mutual aid or benevolent society upon
the death of a member of such society are not subject to the debts of the decedent except by
special contract, but in other respects shall be inventoried and disposed of like other property."
N. D. REV. CODE (1895), s. 6385. See discussion in Jorgensen v. DeViney, 57 N. D. 63, 74; 222
N. W. 464, 468 (1928) ; Farmer's State Bank v. Smith, 36 N. D. 225, 233; 162 N. W. 302, 304
(1917).
' N. 'D. CONST. art. XVII, s. 208, provides: "The right of the debtor to enjoy the comforts
and necessaries of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting from forced sale to
all heads of families a homestead, the value of which shall be limited and defined by law; and a
reasonable amount of personal property; the kind and value shall be fixed by law . . ." In the
opinion of one writer: "The exemption laws of today are almost everywhere vicious. They
extend a protection beyond reason, which is easily done away with by the honest debtor by
incumbering his exemptions, and therefore they destroy their own effect. To the dishonest
debtor they furnish opportunity for moral fraud on his creditors within the law." John H.
Lewis, Principles of Exemption Laws, (1928) 2 DAK. LAW REV. 140, 145.
It has been suggested that laws exempting the proceeds of life insurance permit the
man who owns no property to acquire a homestead. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES (Rev. ed. 1940), a. 175, p. 317. To be effective, such protection should cover the
proceeds in the hands of the beneficiary. N. D. LAWS 1913, c. 191, a. 21 ; N. D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. (1913), s. 5078; N. D. REV. CODE (1943), s.26-1222; covers the beneficiary in fraternal
benellit policies. Held constitutional in Brown v. Steckler, 40 N. D. 113, 1 A.L.R. 753, 168 N.
W. 670 (1918).
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at once from a careful analysis of this section that ambiguity of
expression leaves much to the good judgment of the court. For
example, the term "life insurance" must be defined. Is an annuity
contract "life insurance"?' Would accrued dividends;' endowment
provisions, where the judgment debtor survives the life insurance term;'
disability payments;' or the cash value, where an election is made to
cash in the policy,' be protected?
What does the statute mean 'by the expression "would be payable" ?
Is it necessary to specifically designate the beneficiary falling within
the class protected under the statute? The problem is illustrated by
assuming a case where the insured has a wife, child, or dependent
relative living, but has designated his estate as beneficiary. In such a
case "would be payable" is open to two possible constructions. First, it
might mean that the beneficiary must be designated. Second, it might
mean that any policy which upon death of the insured might fall under
the second section if no change in statute thereafter occurred, is within
the protection of the first section. Since the presumed intention of the
legislature was to protect the wife, child, or dependent relative by
4It is commonly accepted that annuity contracts are not insurance. For an illustrative
case see In re Walsh, 19 F. Supp. 567 (D.Ct. Minn., 1937). At page 575, the court states:"... a savings plan annuity contract, in which the insurance feature is nothing more than
the rettrn of the cash surrender value, does not come within the purview of the statute in
question."
Statutes requiring the filing of insurance forms have been held not to apply to annuity
contracts. Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 146 Or. 32, 28 P.2d 875 (1934) ; Rishel v.
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 F2d 881 (C.C.A. 10th, 1935). The question is frequently raised
in tax cases. Daniel v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 102 ,S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (Foreign
company held not subject to occupation tax on annuity preiiums) ; Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm. Int. Rev., 102 F2d 380 (C.C.A. 1st, 1939) (annuity fund properly included in gross
taxable estate, and not excluded to extent of $40,000 as "Insurance"). However, annuity
contracts frequently combine life insurance features. Compare cases in note 6, infra.
Dividends represent earnings, and the insured is given various options, among which
are included the privilege of receiving them in cash, or applying them upon premiums, adding
them to the principal amount payable to the beneficiary on death, or perhaps applying them
upon additional paid-up insurance. Dividends would seem to be exempt under the broad
language of our statute. But see New York Plumbers' Specialties Co., Inc. v. Stein, 136 Misc.
703, 240 N.Y.S. 834 (1930), where dividends payable to insured were recovered in supplemen-
tary proceedings. But if the insured exercises an option that will benefit the beneficiary, the
result is otherwise. Radnik Realty Corp. v. Moseyeff, 147 Misc. 618, 263 N.Y.S. 440 (1933).
Cf. Bethards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 287 Il1. App. 7, 4 N.E. 2d 257 (1936). Holding
dividends not to be within an exemption statute, see Ellison v. Straw, 119 Wis. 802, 97 N.W.
168 (1903). The Wisconsin court suggests that there is no "legislative intent.., to screen
the husband in building up for himself a fund beyond the reach of his creditors." The court
continues: "Life insurance is one thing, investment is another, but the ingenuity of the life
insurance companies in formulating contracts which confuse the distinction has been active
for generations. Pure life insurance has become rare . . . Life insurance is a promise to pay
a certain sum upon the death of the assiured . . . Doubtless the amount so payable may be
augumented by accumulation of excessive premiums and their earnings in the hands of the
company without destroying the essential character of the contract. When, however, we
find, as frequently, a promise to repay a sum made up from a portion of the premiums and
their earnings at a date certain in the lifetime of the assured, we have only a contract such
as a savings bank may as well make." Id. at 97 N.W. 170.
6The modern trend is contra to Talcott v. Field, 34 Neb. 611. 52 N. W. 400 (1892)
followed in Bank of Brule v. Harper, 141 Neb. 616, 4 N.W.2d 400 (1942). While the invest-
ment feature is prominent in the modern policy, and may play a part where regulatory
problems are involved, as in Marsh v. Bowan, 335 Pa. 305, 6 Atl. 2d 781 (1939) ; the tendency
is to disregard the property rights of the insured when the rights of a beneficiary are under
consideration. See note in 19 A.L.R. 654-664; VANCE INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930), p. 547. As
indicated by the court in Briggs v. McCullough, 36 Cal. 542, 550 (1869), "The term 'life
insurance' is not alone applicable to an insurance for the full term of one's life. On the
contrary, it may be for a term of years, or until the assured shall arrive at a certain age."
Speaking of the annuity feature, the court went on to say: "It is only a new and additional
element in the contract not inconsistent with its other, which is its chief constituent part, to
wit: the undertaking to pay on the death of the assured within the specified term." Id. at 551.,
In accord: Drysch v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 287 Ill. App. 68, 4 N. E. 2d 530 (1936)
(garnishment action); but see Scobie v. Conner, 94 Misc. 429, 157 N.Y.S. 567 (1916).
Disability payments, like dividends, might be considered as no concern of the beneficiary,
since payable to the insured. In fact, the creditor's case is much stronger here. See discussion
by Isadore H. Cohen, Execution Process and Life Insurance, (1939) 39 COL. LAW REV. 139, at
pp. 154 and 161. To the effect that disability -benefits are included in the term "cash suirren-
der" value, see Bank of Greenwood v. Rawls, 117 Fla. 381, 158 So. 173 (1934) ; contra, Com-
missioner of Banks v. Yelverton, 204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. 505 (1933). In the latter case the
court permitted the debtor to select the $300 due him each month as part of the $500 personal
property exemption allowed by statute. The matter is better handled by a separate exemption
statute. See Cohen, op. cit. supra, p. 161, n. 1. Cf. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Wishner, 147
Misc. 288, 265 N.Y.S. 184 (1933) ; Preston v. Martin, 69 S. W. 2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
8 Early cases in New York permitted creditors to reach the cash surrender value, altho
no election to surrender the policy had been made by the insured. Cavagnaro v. Thompson, 78
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exempting the proceeds during the life of the insured, the second view
seems most reasonable!
Whether or not the statute is constructed as covering only desig-
nated beneficiaries, the question still arises, should the court take the
words of the act literally or treat the statute as a blanket exemption?
Thus, if a wife is independently wealthy, will the legal duty of the
husband to support raise a presumption-contrary to the facts-that
she is "likely to be dependent" within the meaning of the statute? Is a
mother "likely to be dependent" upon the son whose life is insured for
her benefit? If we assume that the mother is living with a solvent
husband who carries $100,000.00 of insurance for her benefit, what
then? What of the bachelor without relatives or dependents of any
kind, who either names his estate as beneficiary, or has specified a
beneficiary with the usual alternative provision designating his estate
in case the beneficiary does not survive."0
The answer to these, and many other questions that may arise in
the future depends in part upon the meaning of the second section. If
the latter is an outright exemption statute exempting the proceeds .of
any policy that falls within its terms, before death as well as after, the
reason for enactment of the first section would be hard to explain. It
is possible that the legislature felt that some doubt existed as to present
exemption in favor of the insured, and hence it was necessary to
supplement the second section by enacting the first, thus making it clear
that the exemption was intended to protect dependents related by blood
or marriage.' At any rate, our law is clear on the point that the second
Misc. Rep. 687, 138 N.Y.S. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1912) ; Clark v. Shaw, 91 Misc. Rep. 245, 154 N.Y.S."
1101 (Co. Ct. 1915) ; Hall v. Hess, 97 Misc. Rep. 331, 161 N.Y.S. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1916);
Ecker v. Myer, 118 Misc. Rep. 356, 194 N.Y.S. 320 (City Ct., N. Y. 1922), 118 Misc. Rep.
443. 194 N.Y.S. 654, rev'd on point of practice, 19 Misc. Rep. 375, 196 N.Y.S. 268 (Sup. Ct.
1922). The theory adopted by these cases is based upon the reserved power to change the
beneficiary at will. The decisions indicate that such dominion is inconsistent with property
in the beneficiary, and the policy constitutes assets of the insured available to his creditors
in supplementary proceedings. The customary practice was to apply for appointment of a
receiver who took possession of the policy. It woudd appear proper to conclude that the
receiver had title and hence could exercise all options, including the power to change the
beneficiary and cash in the policy. The New York decisions indicate that his title is not
limited to the cash value. Reynolds v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 160 N. Y. 635, 55 N. E. 305 (1899).
However. in later cases the court changed its view. In Maurice v. Travellers Ins. Co., 121
Misc. 427, 201 N.Y.S. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1923). the receiver sued the company directly. In dis-
missing the complaint, the court intimated that a court of equity had no power to order
the insured to exercise his options under the contract, and in the absence of such an order, the
receiver could recover nothing. The view of the court seems due to faulty reasoning. The
policy is property, and if title passed, the receiver had power to exercise all options under
the contract. Further, a court of equity has inherent power to order the necessary transfer.
In the particular case the beneficiary ultimately recovered the policy, no appeal being taken
by the receiver. Gershman v. Berliner, 214 App. Div. 196, 211 N.Y.S. 881 (1925). The trend
in other jurisdictions is in accord with the last two cases. Murphy v Casey, 150 Minn. 107, 184
N. W. 783 (1921) ; Shurszberg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 15 N. J. Misc. 423, 192 Atl. 451 (1936) :
and note in 57 A.L.R. 695 (1928). Before election by insured to surrender the policy, the
cash value is not subject to garnishment, Bethards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 287 Ill. App.
7, 4 N. E. 2d 257 (1936) ; First Nat. Bank of Burkbarnett v. Friend, 23 S. W. 2d 482 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929) ; nor can it be reached by creditor's bill, Fidelity Coal Co. v. Diamond, 322 IIl.
App. 229, 54 N. E. 2d 240 (1944) ; Contra: Anthracite Ins. Co. v. Sears, 109 Mass. 383 (1872).
In Crossman v. Rauch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934), rev'g. 238 App. Div. 299, 264
N.Y.S. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1933). income paid out under an insurance trust was held not snqbject
to garnishment under special statute.
e No case has reached the Supreme Court in which an attempt was made to secure the
cash surrender value before death of the insured. The statute was mentioned in passing by
only two cases. Re Coughlin, 53 N. D. 188, 205 N. W. 14 (1925) ; Jorgensen v. DeViney, 57
N. D. 63, 222 N.W. 464 (1928). Both decisions speak of the second section as an exemption
statute; that it is not within section 208 of our Constitution, see Farmers' State Bank v.
Smith, 36 N. D. 225, 162 N. W. 302 (1917). The construction contended for seems to be the
one accepted in Tennessee. Wright v. Wright, 100 Tenn. 313, 45 S. W. 672 (1898).
15 Wright v. Wright, 100 Tenn. 313, 45 S. W. 672 (1898).
o 11 "There is nothing in section 8719.. . indicating any intention . . . to control the terms
of a life insurance contract, or to restrict the right of the insured during his lifetime to
dispose of the same or the avails thereof . . . The statute by its express terms, purports to
become effective only upon the death of the insured. It does not even purport to exempt
insurance policies of the kind therein described or the cash surrender value thereof from
the claims of creditors during the lifetime of the insured. In fact, the legislature subsequently
deemed it necessary to enact another statute to accomplish this purpose." Christianson, J.,
in Jorgensen v. DeViney, 57 N. D. 63, 80, 222 N. W. 464, 470 (1928).
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section is an exemption only to the estate of the insured and our court
has taken the position that the constitutional prohibition of unlimited
exemptions has no application to an exemption after death."
The problem of reaching the policy or its proceeds cannot be
disposed of without first considering the nature of the insurance con-
tract and the nature of the beneficiaries' interest therein. A cannot take
B's property to satisfy the debt of another. If the insurance contract
creates a vested property right in the beneficiary, creditors cannot
reach the policy or its value to satisfy the debt of the insured. Thus, the
American view that where no power to change the beneficiary is
reserved, the latter has a vested interest that constitutes property in
the contract itself, carries the logical implication that no exemption
statute is necessary to protect the rights of the beneficiary.'
That such a result did not satisfy the needs of insurer and insured,
is clearly evidenced by the modern practice of reserving power to change
the 'beneficiary, together with other options common to modern
insurance contracts, all exercisable without the consent of any existing
beneficiary.' The new relationship clearly indicated an intent to reserve
all property rights to the insured, and consistent with that view are the
cases which hold that the cause of action is in the insured, rather than
the beneficiary, in case of anticipatory breach 'by the insurer.' But
once the rights of a creditor are involved the courts resort to either of
two principles to protect the beneficiary; some courts adopt the view
that exemption statutes indicate a rule of public policy that prevents
recovery under any type of legal process during the lifetime of the
insured;" a few jurisdictions resort to the vested interest rule despite
reservation of the power to change." Either position seems difficult to
justify. But even so the creditor's problem is not solved. He must
seek legal process that will reduce this asset to possession. Can he
resort to garnishment, attachment, execution, creditor's bill, or supple-
mentary proceedings?" The cases indicate that his chance of success
under any of these is very slim. In the field of the fraudulent convey-
ance his rights are equally doubtful in the absence of legislation."
"Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 36 N. D. 225, 162 N. W. 302 (1917).
'
5
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930), sec. 144, 145, pp. 542-3; 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928), 6399.
14 The various views are summarized in Davis v. Modern Industrial Bank, 279 N. Y. 405,
18 N. E. 2d 639, 135 A.L.R. 1035 (1939) : "The first view is that the insured takes no rights
in the policy during the life of the beneficiary; that he has merely the power to divest the
named beneficiary of his rights and to vest those rights in a new beneficiary. . . The second
view is that the insured, by reserving the right to change the beneficiary and to assign the
policy, retains the beneficial ownership of the policy during life, and that the naming of a
beneficiary constitutes only an instruction to the company to pay at his death to the person
named unless such instruction is changed by the insured. Under this view of the law the
beneficiary has a mere expectancy or vested interest subject to be divested or an inchoate right
depending entirely upon the will of the insured." Hubbs, Judge, id. 18 N. E. 2d at 641, 135
A.L.R. at 1037. The second view is said to represent the great weight of authority. 46 c.J.s., a.
1173, p. 62; 29 AM. Jus. S. 1276. p. 952; 2 CoOLEY, BRETFS ON INsuRANCE, (2d ed. 1928) 'p.
1805; Rasmussen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 N. D. 295, 298, 293 N. W. 805, 807 (1940).
"29 Am. Jun. s. 313, p. 286; 46 C.J.S. a. 1266, p. 289; 48 A.L.R. 110; 107 A.L.R. 1235.
16 See Murphy v. Casey, 150 Minn. 107, 184 N. W. 783 (1921) ; Shurszberg v. Prudentioal
Ins. Co., 15 N. J. Misc. 423, 192 At. 451 (1936), cited supra, note 8.
17 See cases cited in note 8. 46 C.J.S., a. 1179, p. 86; 37 C.J., s. 354, p. 588; and Nat. Bank
of Commerce v. Appel Clothing Co., 35 Col. 149, 83 Pac. 965 (1905).
"8Attachment: 6 C.J., s. 377, p. 206; 7 C.J.S., s. 80, p. 265; 4 Am. Jua., a. 804, p. 746.
Execution: 23 C.J., a. 48, p. 327; 33 C.J.S., s. 80, p. 160; 21 Am. JuR., a. 405, p. 202; Annota-
tions in 44 A.L.R. 1189, 57 A.L.R. 695; FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS (3d ed . ....-.... ) see. 112,
p. 434. SvyZ9ccrtary Ps-oceediegs: 2 C. J., a. 939, r. 88; 33 C.J.S. S. 850, p. 655; 21
Am. JUR., a. 690, p. 327. Garnishment: 28 C.J., sec. 208, pp. 165-66; 38 C.J.S., s. 110 (c), p.
317; 4 Am. JuR., a. 293, p. 740.
19 Fraudulent conveyances are beyond the scope of this brief comment, but see the excellent
discussion by Isadore H. Cohen, The Fraudulent Transfer of Life Insurance Policies, (1940) 88
U. PA. LAW REv. 771, Recovery is sometimes limited to the cash surrender value. First Wis.
Nat. Bank of Milwaukee v. Roehling, 224 Wis. 316, 269 N. W. 677 (1936), rehearing denied
224 Wis. 316, 272 N. W. 664 (1936) ; Equitable Life Ins. Society of U. S. V. Hitchcock, 210
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Finally, is the statute constitutional? Our court has never passed
on this question in relation to the section under discussion.' Since the
statute itself purports to be an exemption to the insured during his
lifetime, the question must be answered at some time in the future.
Unfortunately, any discussion of these problems is complicated by
a judicial tendency to emote rather than reason when the supposed rights
of a beneficiary are at stake.' The courts are distinctly opposed to any
onslaught on the fortress of insurance. Little or no authority can be
cited from other jurisdictions to support the right of a creditor to
insurance proceeds during the lifetime of the insured.' The writer
feels, however, that current decisions on this subject constitute judicial
legislation which has removed assets bordering on astronomical propor-
tions beyond the reach of creditors.' A critical analysis of our statutory
and case law seems both timely and proper.
The problem is high-lighted when we consider the case of a will.
Let us assume that the husband and father invests in a well selected
group of stocks and bonds. He drafts a will which sets up a trust after
his death for the benefit of his wife and children. Here we have the
essence of the insurance contract with power reserved to change the
beneficiary at will, or to surrender the policy and demand the cash value.
Yet in the case of the policy the assets are exempt under our liberal
statute; while in the other case creditors can reach those assets not
covered by other exemption laws. Indeed, it cannot be said that one
form of transaction shows more of intent to benefit the wife and
children than the other. In fact the free use of the policy as collateral
in modern business indicates that it is primarily a savings device in
many cases, and the real purpose is to benefit the insured during his
lifetimes
Stated concisely, then, the two sections under consideration carry
the following implications. The first section purports to cover all
policies, whether made payable to members of the class covered in the
act, by name or as a class; or payable to the estate of one who has a
Mich. 72, 258 N. W. 214 (1935) ; commented on in Wis. LAw REV. (1946) 329, by H. Keith
Frey, Creditor Versus Widow on Life Insurance Proceeds.
"Most authorities hold that the head of a family may rightfully devote a portion of his
earnings to insuring his life, thereby making reasonable provision for his family after death,
without being held to have intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, even though he
may have been insolvent at the time of procuring the insurance. . ." 24 Am. JUR., a. 87, p.
237. The decision in Washington Central Bank v. Hums, 128 U. S. 195, 32 L. Ed. 370, 9 S. Ct.
41 (1888), that the creditor must prove that the insurance company participated in the fraud,
seems indefensible in view of the fact that the beneficiary is a donee. Contra: Merchant's &
Miners' Transportation Co. v. Borland, 53 N. J. Eq. 282, 31 Atl. 272 (1895). While no fraudu-
lent conveyance results from the transfer of exempt property, a different problem is posed
where premiums come out of the debtor's estate. See Williston, Can An Insolvent Debtor Insure
His Life For The Benefit Of His Wife? (1891), 25 Am. LAw REV. 185, 193.
20 If the statute under consideration is applied to past debts it would impair the obligation
of contract clause in the Federal Constitution. This would be true even though the policy was
taken out after passage of the act, provided the debt existed prior thereto. Bank of Minden v.
Clement, 296 U. S. 126, 65 L. Ed. 857, 41 S. Ct. 408 (1921) ; W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U. S. 426, 78 L. Ed. 1344, 93 A.L.R. 173, 94 S. Ct. 816 (1934). This principle has been
applied by state courts. Skinner v. Holt, 9 S.D. 427, 69 N.W. 595 (1896) ; Trust Co. v. Fay,
14 Wash. 936, 45 Pac. 153 (1896) ; Rice v. Smith, 72 Miss. 42, 16 So. 417 (1894). But com-
pare the language in How v. How. 61 Minn. 217, 63 N.W. 627 (1895), modifying 61 N.W. 456
(1894). "On a motion for reargument it was suggested for the first time that . . . the
statute merely attempted to exempt from her creditors a gift to the debtor, that she parted
with no consideration for this gift, and her creditors are in no way injured . . . that without
the aid of this statute, by the intervention of a trustee, the donor could have given her the
benefit of this fund exempt from seizure by her creditors . . ." Id. 63 N.W. 627.
Exemption provisions in state constitutions have been liberally construed in Washington
and California. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 202, 49 L.Ed. 1018, 25 S. Ct. 656 (1905).
21 See Cohen, op. cit. supra, note 19, at pp. 140, 171.
2 But see references in note 17, susra.
2 Much has been written on the subject; for a critical analysis, see two articles by
Cohen: Execution Process and Life Insurance (1939) 39 COL. LAW REV. 139; The Fraudulent
Transfer of Life Insurance Policies, (1940) 88 U. PA. L. REV. 771.
24 See cases cited in notes 4, 5, 6.
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wife, children, or dependent relatives living at the moment the creditor
seeks to realize on the policy.'
It seems reasonable that the statute should not be construed to
cover any of the 'beneficiaries within the classes named in the statute
unless they are "dependent," in fact, upon the insured. A holding to
the contrary could not be classed as the exemption of "a reasonable
amount of personal property" within section 208 of our constitution.
Further, it would seem to be an unjustifiable extension of the language
used in the statute." In the absence of express legislation, one having
a mere expectancy has no standing either from the legal or moral stand-
point, as against the rights of creditors.' Since our court has recognized
that the exemption under the second section does not create a vested
right in the beneficiary," and the control of the insured over the policy
is limited only by the express terms of the contract, it would be reason-
able to conclude from the language used in the first section, that the
legislature was vesting in the courts, discretionary power to prevent
abuse of a liberal exemption. Viewed from that standpoint, most
constitutional objections would disappear. The only objection remaining
would be technical-since the constitution states that the "kind and
value shall be fixed by law"-would the act so interpreted be an illegal
delegation of legislative powers?
The case of the bachelor without dependent relatives does not fall
within the spirit of the law. The bulk of exemptions are allowed only
to the head of the family as defined 'by law. The purpose is to protect
dependents, not the insured.'
The act probably does cover a policy payable to a beneficiary outside
the classes protected in the statute. However, two situations are
possible and must be distinguished. As already indicated, if no power
to change is reserved, under the vested interest rule creditors of the
insured are helpless.' Where the power to change is reserved, we are
faced with the proposition that by exercising the power to change the
beneficiary the policy may be brought at once under the protection of
the statute. Of course, it might be contended, that the diligent creditor
could secure a restraining order," and if we concede that the cash
surrender value can be reached by supplementary proceedings, this
seems entirely logical. It must be admitted that if the insured effects
the change before the creditor can act, the statute will protect him unless
the change constitutes a fraudulent conveyance." The better view
supports a holding that a change of beneficiary by an insolvent, at least
where the policy has a cash surrender value, is a fraudulent conveyance
and can be set aside in equity.'
The second section, as we have seen, has no operation until the
death of the insured.' This being true, those policies not within the
"The statute has not been judicially construed on this point.
"But see the specious argument advanced in the How case, cited supra note 20. It might
be noted that trust analogies fail here for lack of a trust res. Rather, we are dealing with a
contract, and third party rights thereunder.




S0VANCE, Op. cit. supra note 13.
"N. D. REV. COoE (1943), SS. 28-2512, 32-1001. Hall v. Hess, 27 Misc. 331, 161. N.Y.S. 418
(Sup. Ct. 1916).
2Note 19, supra
-"See references, first paragraph note 19, supra.
8Note 11, upra.
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protection of the first section should be subject to legal process. A policy
of insurance is personal property within the meaning of the statute
defining property subject to execution." The immediate objection to
use of this process is that no debt is due." But that would seem to be
no obstacle. Promissory notes not yet due may be levied upon and
must be sold unless the purchaser or creditor is willing to receive them
at par." While it is true that few cases will ever arise when an insurance
policy would be accepted at par by a creditor, because premiums must
be kept up to realize anything-yet if a twenty year pay contract has
but a short time to run it would be readily salable and an excellent
investment. ' Nor is the requirement of an insurable interest any objec-
tion to such a procedure."
On the other hand, the true value of the ordinary life policy is
fairly represented by its cash surrender value-an asset that should be
readily available to creditors' in the absence of exemption. If a man
has $10,000 in his pocket, surely a court can order him to reach into that
pocket and pay the non-exempt portion to a creditor. That seems a
fair statement of the problem here. If the creditor seeks to reach the
cash surrender value his first step might be to secure a lien by actual
levy.'" Such a lien should preserve the rights of the creditor should the
debtor die unexpectedly. Having secured his lien, the creditor will
probably resort to supplementary proceedings at the foot of the judg-
W N. D. REV. CODE (1943), s. 28-2108 provides: "All goods, chattels, moneys, and other
property, both real and personal, or any interest therein, of the judgment debtor not exempt by
law, and all property and rights of property seized and held under attachment in the action
are subject to execution. Shares and interests in any corporation or company, and debts and
credits, and all other property, both real and personal, and any interest in real or personal
property, and all other property not capable of manual delivery, may be taken on execution . ."
That the policy may be assigned and transferred by will, see Talcott v. Bailey, 54 N.D1. 19,
208 N.W. 549 (1926). The insured clearly has an interest in personal property when he owns
a policy on his life with power to assign or change the beneficiary at will. Anthracite Ins.
Co. v. Sears, 109 Mass. 383 (1872) ; Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Mo. State Life Ins.
Co., 222 Mo. App. 1228, 3 S.W. 2d 1046 (1928).
N See 21 AM. Jua., s. 405, p. 202; Boisseau v. Bass' Adm'r, 100 Va. 207, 40 S.E. 647 (1902)
(insured could not collect until twenty year endowment period elapsed) ; most of the early
cases involved policies with no cash surrender value provision. DaV v. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins.
Co.. 111 Pa. 507, 4 Atl. 748, 56 Am. Rep. 297 (1886).
3
7 
Johson v. Dahlquist, 130 Wash. 29, 225 Pac. 817 (1924), and authorities cited therein;
Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 222 Mo. App. 1228, 3 S.W. 2d.
1046 (1928).
38N. D. REV. CODE (1943), s. 28-2114 provides:
"Money levied on may be appropriated without being advertised or sold. The same may
be done with judgments, drafts, promissory notes, or other papers of like character, if the
judgment creditor will receive them at their par value, and an assignment thereof by the
officer shall have the same effect as if made by the execution debtor."
The implication is that if not receivable at par these instruments must be sold by the
sheriff. But an undefined rule of public policy might prevent a public sale of an insurance
policy. The rule is ennunciated by the court in Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Mo. State
Life Ins. Co., cited eupra, note 35: "We are firmly convinced, however, that a life insurance
policy eannot be bartered and sold as a chattel at a public sale on execution. Our statute does
not contemplate that property of such character may be sold. The creditor has no right to
collect more than his debt, and no person purchasing at a sale, if such were permitted.
could acquire a greater right than the creditor might have . . . If policies of insurance of this
character could be sold to any person who might desire to speculate therein, it would result
in interminable litigation and confusion and likewise would seem to be against public policy."
Id. 3 N.W. 2d at 1049.
lN. D. REV. CODE (1943), S. 26-0212.
' But the creditor is limited by the terms of the contract. If the policy has no cash
surrender value, and public policy prevents barter or sale, the only procedure would be to levy,
thus securing a lien which could only be realized on after death. It should be noted that not all
modern policies give an option to the insured to take the cash value at any time. Such a
right generally arises only after a premium is in default. However, the policies do have a loan
value, they can be assigned, and are frequently pledged as collateral, hence it should follow that
a lien could be secured by levy of execution, and if this occurs while a premium is in default,
or shortly before a default occurs, the problem of realization should be solved. Anthracite Ins.
Co. v. Sears, 109 Mass. 383 (1872) ; Industrial Loan & Investment Co. v. Mo. State Life Ins.
Co.. 222 Mo. App. 1228, 3 S.W. 2d 1046 (1928).
'5 But the weight of authority does not sustain this view. However, the prevailing view
appears to be based upon earlier cases which dealth with policies having no cash surrender
value, or were decided in jurisdictions which followed the common law rule that choses in
action could not be reached by execution. Compare the practice in- New York (cases cited
supra, note 8), with the practice in Virginia (cast cited supra, note 36).
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ment,'2 asking the court to appoint a receiver, and directing the receiver
to make the necessary transfer. 3 Of course, supplementary proceedings
at the foot of the judgient, based upon a return of execution unsatis-
fied, constitute the logical remedy where the creditor cannot reach the
policy under regular process. If the court considers our statute inade-
quate to handle these situations, then a creditor's bill in aid of execution
should be an available remedy." In the writer's opinion, cases to the
contrary are based not upon a lack of power, but upon a judicial
determination not to use it. Since we have no judicial authority in this
state to prevent such a construction of our procedural statutes, it is to
be hoped that the views expressed above will be given effect.'
Coming to the question of policy, and it seems clear that this is a
legislative and not a judicial question, it appears to the writer that the
act as it now stands is not adequate. If the purpose is to protect the
widow and dependents, it fails to achieve its end because no bar is
placed upon her creditors whether existing prior to the death of the
insured or subsequent thereto. Even a partial bar covering creditors
whose claims arose prior to the death of the insured, would be better
than no bar at all. It is further suggested that the term "life insurance"
be defined. While the language used is broad, it would not seem to
cover annuity contracts, and some doubt might exist as to single prelmium
endowment policies. It should cover disability benefits and define the
amount exempt. The act contains no provisions as to preniums paid in
fraud of creditors, or fraudulent assignments. It is not at all clear that
the rejection of a clause covering premiums paid in fraud of creditors
grew out of an understanding by the legislators that such a clause was
unnecessary, or showed an intent that the premiums should not be
recoverable in such a case. In view of our recent enactment of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, this statute should contain pro-
visions covering the rights of a defrauded creditor. The amount of
insurance exempt under law should be limited as required by the
constitution. To complete the picture, if any doubt exists as to the
availability of legal process to. reach the proceeds of a non-exempt
policy, and to make it clear',that a creditor need not wait until the death
of the insured, a clause should be inserted, either in the exemption
statute, or in the provisions governing supplementary proceedings,
specifically covering the case of an insurance policy. The act might
well make special provision for the case of the policy that exceeds the
exemption. Provision might be made to keep the creditor's lien alive
until the policy matures, or for a court order compelling a surrender and
,issuance of a new policy for the exempt amount where policy provisions
permit. Certainly the subject of insurance exemptions is worthy of
consideration by the Legislative Research Committee. The New York
4s "We are of the opinion that when an insurance policy is attached . . . it should be
placed in the hands of a receiver . . . or, if no receiver be appointed, then the attaching
officer should perform such duties and collect the amount due . . . as he would a note or
other obligation." Industrial Loan & Investment Co., v. Mo. State Life In$. Co.. 222 Mo. App.
1228, 3 S.W. 2d 1046 (1928), cited supra, note 40.
'a Supplementary proceedings are commonly used. See references in note 18, supra; and the
practice in New York, cases cited in note 8, supra.
" 16 C. J., a. 79, p. 1404; 21 C.J.S., a. 21; p. 1068; Anthracite Ia. Co., v. Sears, .109
Mass. 383 (1872).
0 Compare the attitude of the court in O'Connor v. McManus, 71 N.D. 88. 299 N.W. 22
(1941).
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statute has served as a model for many states, and is set out below.'
With one modification, setting out the amount of exempt insurance to
comply with our constitution, it might well serve as a working model
for the amendment of our own statute.
ON. Y. Ins. Law a. 166 provides:
"Exemption of proceeds and avails of certain insurance and annuity contracts. 1. If any
policy of insurance has been or shall be effected by any person on his own life in favor of a
third person beneficiary, or made payable, by assignment, change of beneficiary or otherwise,
to a third person, such third person beneficiary, assignee or payee shall be entitled to the
proceeds and avails of such policy as against the creditors, personal representatives, trustees
in bankruptcy and receivers in state and federal courts of the person effecting the insurance.
If any policy of insurance has been or shall be effected by any person upon the life of
another person in favor of the person effecting the same or made payable, by assignment,
change of beneficiary or otherwise, to such person, the latter shall be entitled to the proceeds
and avails of such policy as against the creditors, personal representatives, trustees in bank-
ruptcy and receivers in state and federal courts of the person insured; if the person effecting
such insurance shall be the wife of the insured, she shall be entitled to the proceeds and
avails of such policy as against her own creditors, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers in
state and federal courts. If any policy of insurance has been or shall be effected by any
person on the life of another person in favor of a third person beneficiary, or made payable,
by assignment, change of beneficiary or otherwise, to a third person, such third person
beneficiary, assignee or payee shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of such policy as
against the creditors, personal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy and receivers in state
and federal courts of the person insured and of the person effecting the insurance. The
term "proceeds and avails" shall include death benefits, cash surrender and loan values, pre-
miums waived, and dividends, whether used in reduction of the premiums or in whatsoever
manner used or applied, excepting only where the debtor has, subsequent to the issuance of the
policy, actually elected to receive the dividends in cash. The person insured in a case under
the first sentence of this subsection, or the person effecting the insurance other than the
wife of the insured in a case under the second sentence, and the person effecting the insurance
under the third sentence thereof, or the executor or administrator of any such persons, or a
person entitled to the proceeds or avails of such policy in trust for such persons shall not be
deemed a third person beneficiary, assignee or payee. A policy shall be deemed payable to a
third person beneficiary if and to the extent that, a facility-of-payment clause or similar
clause, in the policy permits the insurer to discharge its obligation after the death of the
person insured by paying the death benefits to a third person as herein defined. The pro-
visions of this section shall be applicable whether or not the right is reserved in any such
policy to change the beneficiary therein designated, and whether or not the policy is made
payable to the person whose life is insured if the beneficiary, assignee or payee shall predecease
such person; and no person shall be compelled to exercise any rights, powers, options or
privileges under such policy.
"2. No money or other benefits payable or allowable under any policy or insurance
against disability arising from accidental injury or bodily infirmity or ailment of the person
insured, shall be liable to execution for the purpose of satisfying any debt or liability of the
insured, whether incurred before or after the commencement of the disability, except as
provided in subsection four, and except further that (a) with respect to debts or liabilities
incurred for necessaries furnished the insured after the commencement of disability, the
exemption shall not include any income payment benefits payable as a result of any dis-
ability of the insured, and (b) with respect to all other debts or liabilities incurred after the
commencement of disability of the insured, the exemption of income payment benefits payable
as a result of any disability of the insured shall not at any time exceed payment at rate of four
hundred dollars per month for the period of such disability. When a policy provides for lump
sum payment because of a dismemberment or other specific loss of insured, such payment
shall be exempt from execution of insured's creditors. The provisions of this subsection
shall not affect the assignability of any benefit otherwise assignable.
"3. The benefits, rights, privileges and options which, under any annuity contract here-
tofore or hereafter issued are due or prospectively due the annuitant, who paid the considera-
tion for the annuity contract, shall not be subject to execution nor shall the annuitant be
compelled to exercise any such rights, powers or options contained in said annuity contract,
nor shall creditors be allowed to interfere with or terminate the contract, except (a) as
provided in subsection four and except (b) that the total exemption of benefits presently
due and payable to any annuitant periodically or at stated times under all annuity contracts
under which he is an annuitant, shall not at any time exceed four hundred dollars per
month for the length of time represented by such installments, and that such periodic
payment shall be subject to garnishee execution to the same extent as are wages and sal-
aries, . . ; and (c) that if the total benefits presently due and payable to any annuitant
under all annuity contracts under which he is an annuitant, shall at any time exceed payment
at the rate of four hundred dollars per month, then under the provisions of the civil practice
act, the court may order such annuitant to pay to a judgment creditor or apply on the
judgment, in installments, such portion of such excess benefits, as to the court may appear
just and proper, after due regard for the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and
his family, if dependent upon him, as well as any payments required to be made by the
annuitant to other creditors under prior court orders. The benefits, rights, privileges or
options accruing under such contract to a beneficiary or assignee shall not be transferrable nor
subject to commutation, and if the benefits are payable periodically or at stated times, the
same exemptions and exceptions contained herein for the annuitant, shall apply with respect to
such beneficiary or assignee.
"An annuity contract within the meaning of this section shall be any obligation to pay
certain sums at stated times, during life or lives, or for a specified term or terms, issued for
a valuable consideration, regardless of whether or not such sums are payable to one or more
persons, jointly or otherwise, but does not include payments under a life insurance policy
at stated times during life or lives, or for a specified term or terms.
"4. Every assignment or change of beneficiary, or other transfer, shall be valid, except
in cases of transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, as such actual
intent is defined by article 10 of the debtor and creditor law (UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCEs ACT, N. D. REV. CODE (1943) GS 13-1201, to 13-0211; in case of transfer with
(Continued on next page)
